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Articles
Some Notes on the
Establishment Clause
Akhil Reed Amar*
In a state formed in a struggle for religious freedom, and at a
law school and university named after Roger Williams, what topic
could be more appropriate for an Inaugural Lecture than the topic
of religious liberty?
My text tonight is a familiar one-the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment. Let us begin by looking carefully at these
words, and pondering anew their significance: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. ..

."

The Establishment Clause did more than prohibit Congress
from establishing a national church. Its mandate that Congress
shall make no law "'respecting'an establishment of religion" also
prohibited the national legislature from interfering with, or trying
to disestablish, churches established by state and local
governments. 1
* Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School. This essay derives from the Roger
Williams University Law Review's Inaugural Lecture delivered on April 19, 1996.
1. For more support and elaboration, see Edward Dumbauld, The Bill of
Rights And What It Means Today 104 & n.5 (1957); 2 William Winslow Crosskey,
Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States 1057, 1060, 107274 (1953); Wilbur Katz, Religion and American Constitutions 8-10 (1964); Gerard
V. Bradley, Church-State Relationships in America 76, 92-95 (1987); Joseph M.
Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 Wash.
U.L.Q. 371; Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution:An
Equal ProtectionApproach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 311, 321-23 (1986); William C. Porth & Robert P. George, Trimming the
Ivy: A BicentennialRe-examination of the Establishment Clause, 90 W. Va. L. Rev.
109, 136-39 (1987); Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1113, 1132-35 (1988); William K Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause:Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation,
39 DePaul L. Rev. 1191 (1990).
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In 1789, at least six states had government-supported
churches. Congregationalism held sway in New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Connecticut under local-rule establishment
schemes, while Maryland, South Carolina and Georgia each featured a more general form of establishment in their respective
state constitutions. 2 And, even in the arguably "non-establishment" states, church and state were hardly separate; for example,
at least four of these states, in their constitutions no less, barred
non-Christians or non-Protestants from holding government office. 3 According to one tally, eleven of the thirteen states had religious qualifications for officeholding. 4 Interestingly, the federal
Establishment Clause, as finally worded, most closely tracked the
proposal from the ratifying convention of one of the staunchest establishment states, New Hampshire: "Congress shall make no laws
touching religion" - a proposal that of course would immunize
New Hampshire from any attempted federal disestablishment. 5 In
the first Congress, Representative Samuel Livermore from New
Hampshire initially won the assent of the House for this wording,
only to lose in turn to another formulation. 6 But when all the dust
had settled the final version of the clause returned to its states'
rights roots. In the words of Joseph Story's celebrated Commentaries on the Constitution,"Thus, the whole power over the subject of
7
religion is left exclusively to the state governments ...
2. See Leonard W. Levy, Jefferson and Civil Liberties: The Darker Side 5
(1963); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1437 (1990). Cf. Bradley, supra note
1, at 13 ("[Ejach of the thirteen original states generously aided and promoted religion and should therefore, according to Levy's methodology, be called establishment regimes.").
3. See Pa. Const. of 1776, § 10; Del. Const. of 1776, art. 22; N.C. Const. of
1776, art. XXXII; N.J. Const. of 1776, art. XIX. In Rhode Island, Jews and
Catholics were apparently ineligible for citizenship. See Bradley, supra note 1, at
29.

4. Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the
Passage of the First Amendment 221 (1986).
5. See 1 Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 326 (Jonathan
Elliot ed. 1888) [hereinafter Elliot's Debates] (emphasis added); 2 Crosskey, supra
note 1, at 1068, 1073-74; Bradley, supra note 1, at 76, 79; David A. Anderson, The
Origins of the Free Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 455, 481 n.164 (1983).
6. Dumbauld, supra note 1, at 39, 43 n.37 (discussing events of August 15
and 20, 1789).
7. 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
§ 1873 (1833).
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The key point is not simply that, as with the rest of the First
Amendment, the Establishment Clause limits only Congress and
not the states. That point is obvious on the face of the Amendment
and is confirmed by its legislative history. (It also, of course, has
the imprimatur of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Barron v.
Baltimore.") Nor is the main point exhausted once we recognize
that state governments are in part the special beneficiaries of, and
rights-holders under, the clause. Indeed, the same thing could be
said, to some degree, about the Free Speech Clause. 9 The special
prick of the point is this: the nature of the states' establishment
clause right against federal disestablishment makes it quite awkward to mechanically "incorporate" the clause against the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment. Incorporation of the Free Speech
Clause against states does not negate state legislators' own First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech in the legislative assembly. But incorporation of the Establishment Clause has precisely
this kind of effect; to apply the clause against a state government is
precisely to eliminate its right to choose whether to establish a religion-a right explicitly confirmed by the Establishment Clause
itself!
To put the point a slightly different way, the structural reasons that counsel caution in attempting to incorporate the Tenth
Amendment against the states seem valid here too. The original
establishment clause, on a close reading, is not anti-establishment,
but pro-states' rights; it is agnostic on the substantive issue of establishment versus non-establishment, and simply calls for the issue to be decided locally. (In this respect it is the American
equivalent of the European Peace of Augsburg in 1555 and Treaty
of Westphalia in 1648, decreeing that religious policy would be set
locally rather than imperially.) But how can such a local option
clause be mechanically incorporated against localities, requiring
them to pass no laws (either way!) on the issue of, i.e., "respecting,"
establishment?1 0
To my knowledge no scholar or judge has argued for incorporating the Tenth Amendment, but few seem critical of, or even con8.

32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).

9. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J.
1131, 1151 (1991).

10. See Bradley, supra note 1, at 95; Conkle, supra note 1, at 1141; Porth &
George, supra note 1, at 136-39.
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cerned about, the blithe manner in which the Establishment
Clause has come to apply against the states. The apparent reason
for this lack of concern, and for the Supreme Court's initial decision to incorporate the clause, is an assumption that virtually all
the provisions of the Bill of Rights, except the Tenth Amendment,
were designed solely to protect an individual's rights. If this assumption is true, total incorporation of the first nine amendments
seems eminently sensible, and wonderfully clean to boot. Unfortunately, this assumption is false.
There is, however, another clean solution to the problem that
may well do more justice to history and structure. The Fourteenth
Amendment might best be read as incorporating free exercise, but
not establishment, principles against state governments. Like the
Speech, Press, Assembly and Petition Clauses, the Free Exercise
Clause was paradigmatically about citizens' rights, not states'
rights; it thus invites incorporation. Indeed, this clause was specially concerned with the plight of minority religions, and thus
meshed especially well with the minority-rights thrust of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thomas Jefferson, often invoked today as a strong opponent of
religious establishment, appears to have understood the states'
rights aspects of the original establishment clause. While he argued for an absolutist interpretation of the First Amendmentthat the federal government should have nothing to do with religion in the states, control of which was beyond Congress's limited
delegated powers-he was more willing to flirt with governmental
endorsements of religion at the state level, especially where no
state coercion would impinge on the freedom of conscience of dissenters. The two ideas were logically connected; it was especially
easy to be an absolutist about the federal government's involvement in religion if one understood that the respective states had
broad authority over their citizens' education and morals. Thus,
while PresidentJefferson in 1802 refused to proclaim a day of religious Thanksgiving, he had done just that as Governor Jefferson
some 20 years before." In defending his practice to Reverend Sal. Compare Proclamation Appointing a Day of Thanksgiving and Prayer
(Nov. 11, 1779), reprinted in 3 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 177 (Julian P. Boyd
ed. 1951), with Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Attorney General Levi Lincoln
(Jan. 1, 1802), reprintedin 8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 129 (Paul Leicester
Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1897). See also Second Inaugural Address
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muel Miller in 1808, Jefferson quoted both the First and Tenth
Amendments, and explained:
I am aware that the practice of my [Presidential] predecessors may be quoted. But I have ever believed that the example of state executives led to the assumption of that authority
by the general government, without due examination, which
would have discovered that what might be a right in a state
government, was a violation of that right when assumed by
12
another.
Interestingly, a virtually identical view was voiced in the First
Congress on September 25, 1789-the very day the Bill of Rights
cleared both houses. When New Jersey Representative Elias
Boudinot introduced a bill recommending "a day of public
thanksgiving and prayer," South Carolina's Thomas Tucker rose
up in opposition: "[I]t is a religious matter, and as such, is proscribed to us. If a day of thanksgiving must take place, let it be
3
done by the authority of the several States."'
This states' rights understanding helps to explain why the
religion clauses and the rights of speech, press and so on, were
lumped together into a single amendment. To be sure, there is
much truth in a libertarian reading, rooted in conventional wisdom: the Free Exercise Clause flanks the Free Speech Clause to
remind us of the importance of protecting not only political speech
(as emphasized by the adjoining Petition and Assembly Clauses)
but religious speech too. 14 This libertarian reading also draws

strong support from the history of the antebellum and reconstruction eras. But this conventional account tends to miss an important federalism dynamic at work in the 1780s.
Like the general topic of state religious policy, restrictions on
speech and press were seen by many as beyond Congress's enumerated powers. 15 During the closing days of the Philadelphia Con(Mar. 4, 1805), reprintedin 8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 341 n.1, 344 (suggesting that states have power over religion where federal government has none).
12. Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Reverend Samuel Miller (January 23, 1808),
reprinted in 5 The Founders' Constitution 98-99 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
13. 1 Annals of Cong. 949-50 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (1st ed. pagination).
14. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 484. But see id. at 488 (noting anachronism
of this reading). See also Murray Dry, Flag Burning and the Constitution, 1990
Sup. Ct. Rev. 69, 72.
15. See generally William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee
of a Freedom of Expression, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 91, 117-19 (1984).
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vention, a proposal explicitly to guarantee "liberty of the Press"
quickly went down to defeat after Roger Sherman shrugged it off
as "unnecessary-The power of Congress does not extend to the
Press." 16 During the ratification debates Sherman's one-liner became the Federalist party line on press freedom, affirmed over and
over, not just by Sherman and fellow moderates like Oliver Ellsworth, Hugh Williamson, Richard Dobbs Spaight, and Edmund
Randolph, but also by strong nationalists like Alexander Hamilton,
James Iredell, Charles Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,
Noah Webster, and James Wilson. 17 So too, Federalists of all
stripes-Madison, Wilson, Iredell, Randolph, Spaight, Ellsworth,
and Sherman, for example-declared that the federal government
simply had no jurisdiction over religion in the several states.' 8
Thus, the First Amendment opened with words suggesting an utter lack of enumerated power to regulate religion in the states or to
restrict speech-"Congress shall make no law'-in sharp contrast
to the language of later amendments dealing with areas where
Congress clearly did enjoy enumerated Article I power to "make...
16. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 617-18 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter Farrand].
17. See Roger Sherman, A Citizen of New Haven (II), in Essays on the Constitution of the United States 237, 239 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, Burt
Franklin 1892); Oliver Ellsworth, The Landholder (VI) in id. at 161, 164; Hugh
Williamson, Remarks on the New Plan of Government, in id. at 395, 398; 4 Elliot's
Debates, supra note 5, at 208-09 (Richard Dobbs Spaight); 3 id. at 203-04, 469
(Edmund Randolph); The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); James Iredell,
Answers to Mr. Mason's Objections, in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the
United States 360-61 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, Burt Franklin 1888); 4
Elliot's Debates, supra note 5, at 259-60 (Charles Pinckney); id. at 315 (Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney); Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles
of the Federal Constitution, in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States
25, 48 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, Burt Franklin 1888); 2 Elliot's Debates,
supra note 5, at 449, 468 (James Wilson); James Wilson, Speech on the Federal
Constitution, in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States 156-57 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., New York, Burt Franklin 1888). At least one leading AntiFederalist agreed with the Federalists on this point. See Letters from the Federal
Farmer (IV) in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 250 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
For a similar statement in the first Congress, see 2 Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of
Rights: A Documentary History 1034-35 (1971) (remarks of James Jackson) (June
8, 1789).
18. See, e.g., 3 Elliot's Debates, supra note 5, at 93, 330 (James Madison); 2
id. at 455 (James Wilson); 4 id. at 194-95 (James Iredell); 3 id. at 203-04, 469
(Edmund Randolph); 4 id. at 208 (Richard Dobbs Spaight); Oliver Ellsworth, The
Landholder (VI) in Essays on the Constitution of the United States, supra note 17,
at 164; Schwartz, supra note 17, at 1088 (August 15, 1789) (Roger Sherman).
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law." For example, the Militia and War Power Clauses of Article I
gave Congress broad power over military matters addressed by the
Second and Third Amendments; Congressional authorization of
various searches and seizures clearly fell within its explicit power
to regulate customs and captures, among other things; and Article
I expressly authorized Congress to "constitute tribunals," whose
procedures were the main subject of the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Eighth Amendments. 1 9
The "Congress shall make no law" Amendment's precise location in the original Bill is also quite illuminating. Recall that the
First Congress originally proposed not ten, but twelve amendments as its Bill of Rights. The First Congress's original First
Amendment focused on congressional size and obviously modified
Article I, Section 2, and the original Second amended Article I, Section 6, dealing with congressional salary. Then came our First
(their Third) Amendment, glossing the Article I, Section 8 catalogue by suggesting that Congress lacked enumerated power to
censor expression or regulate state religious policy-a kind of reverse "necessary and proper" clause. Only after this implied gloss
on Section 8 was it appropriate to add later amendments implicitly
expanding the catalogue of Article I, Section 9, many of whose provisions cut across powers that were indeed conferred in Section 8.
Seen from this angle, the order of amendments precisely tracks the
order of the original Constitution itself-first Section 2, then Section 6, then Section 8, and only then Section 9 and so on. (Later
amendments governing the judicial process can also be seen as
modifying Article III rules for federal courts; and the last two
amendments laid down global rules of construction aimed at all
federal powers, not just those of Congress.) When we remember
that Madison originally proposed to interweave his amendments
into the original Constitution rather than tack them on at the end,
it makes sense that the order of amendments would track the order of the Constitution itself.
Of course, the idea that Congress simply lacked Article I enumerated power over various First Amendment domains may seem
wholly fanciful today, given the widespread acceptance of expansive twentieth-century Commerce Clause cases, themselves in19. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16 (war, army and militia powers); id.
cls. 1, 3, 11 (customs, commerce and capture powers); id. cl. 9 (power to constitute
tribunals).
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spired by a broad reading of the nineteenth-century classic,
McCulloch v. Maryland.2 0 Reading the Constitution through
twentieth-century eyes, we must squint quite hard to see the First
Amendment as any different from the seven amendments that follow it, so far as enumerated powers are concerned. But to avoid
anachronism we must ask why so many Federalists cheerfully conceded a lack of congressional power over press and religion in the
states, but failed to make similar concessions in response to other
anti-Federalist objections. Is there not a kernel of truth in the
widespread eighteenth-century notion that, say, searches and
seizures were naturally incidental to-"necessary and proper"
for-the power to collect revenue in a way that press censorship
and religious regulations were generally not? Vestiges of this
eighteenth-century notion can be found even in McCulloch, where
Chief Justice Marshall warned that Congress could not, "under the
pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment
of objects not entrusted to the government...."

21

Though this lan-

guage has lain dormant in recent years, it hints at a stricter reading of enumerated powers in terms of their natural "objects" or
"purposes."2 2 Under this stricter view, each of the next seven
amendments seems to track the natural object of specific enumerated powers much more closely than does the First.
The Senate, at least, appears to have thought so, for there
seems to be no other good explanation for its conscious decision to
fold certain prohibitions, but not others, into the "Congress shall
make no law" category. The subjects covered by our First Amendment had initially been dealt with by the House of Representatives
in two separate amendments. The first addressed religion and
opened with the formulation "Congress shall make no law." The
second encompassed the rights of speech, press, petition and as20. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
21. Id. at 423.
22. Marshall's approach unsurprisingly resembles the colonists' arguments
before 1776 that Parliament could enact bills to regulate trade for the overall benefit of the empire, but could not use this power pretextually to raise revenues. See
Edmund S. Morgan, The Challenge of The American Revolution 3-42 (1976). The
linkage is unsurprising because the debates prior to 1776 involved, in effect, an
early attempt to "constitutionalize" federalism by marking the respective boundaries of the central and local governments within an extended empire. See Akhil
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L. J. 1425, 1445 (1987); Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Background of American Federalism, 12 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 215 (1918).
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sembly, but omitted the "no law" formulation in favor of language
more like that of subsequent amendments (today numbered II
23
through VIII).
Although the Senate merged the two amendments behind
closed doors, leaving us with no transcript of its oral deliberations,
it is plausible to presume the merger was motivated by states'
rights sentiment. After all, the Constitution had structured the
upper house to safeguard the interests of state governmentswhose legislatures of course directly elected Senators. In responding to other aspects of the Bill of Rights proposed by the lower
house, the Senate acted true to its states' rights form: the upper
house killed "the most valuable" amendment on Madison's list, the
presciently numbered Fourteenth, imposing various restrictions on
state government. Also suggestive is the extensive consideration
the Senate gave to various ideas originating in the Virginia ratifying convention that Madison had chosen to omit from his proposed
package of amendments. 24 In its formal instrument of ratification,
the Virginia convention had expressly listed two (and only two) "essential rights" that the convention suggested were beyond the enumerated powers "granted" to the federal government: "liberty of
conscience, and of the press." 25 In keeping with Virginia's view,
the Senate first reworded the House's speech amendment so that it
too began with the phrase "Congress shall make no law," and then
folded this amendment into the only other one that shared this
26
opening formulation.
Most importantly, we must recall the precise wording of the
First Amendment-"Congress shall make no law . .. "-precisely
tracking and inverting the precise wording of the Article I Necessary and Proper Clause: "Congressshall have power... to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper .... " And we should also
note that no state constitution placed press freedoms alongside
religion clauses, thus suggesting a federalism-based logic for their
conjunction in the First Amendment.
Unsurprisingly, Jefferson's absolutist reading of the First
Amendment extended beyond the religion clauses to encompass
speech and press. Yet here, too, it was an absolutism rooted in
23. Dumbauld, supra note 1, at 213-14.
24. Id. at 47 & n.14.
25. 1 Elliot's Debates, supra note 5, at 327.
26. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 481.
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federalism and the idea of enumerated powers. Thus, his Kentucky Resolves of 1798 self-consciously read the First Amendment
with a Tenth Amendment gloss:
[Ilt is true, as a general principle, and is also expressly declared by one of the amendments to the Constitution, that
"the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
states respectively, or to the people;" and that, no power over
the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the
press, [was] delegated to the United States by the Constitution . .. and that, in addition to this general principle and

express declaration, another and more special provision has
been made by one of the amendments to the Constitution,
which expressly declares, that "Congress shall make no laws
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press ... "27
Although this passage could be read to imply that speech and press
rights were reserved to "the people" rather than "the states," and
thus limited state governments as well, Jefferson thought otherwise. As he explained to Abigail Adams in 1804: "While we deny
that Congress have [sic] a right to control the freedom of the press,
we have ever asserted the right of the States, and their exclusive
28
right, to do so."

So too, Madison's famous Report of 1800 on the Virginia Resolutions declared that "the power .

.

. over the press, was neither

among the enumerated powers, nor incident to any of them" and
that the First Amendment simply reaffirmed "a positive denial to
Congress of any power whatever on the subject."2 9 Madison then
proceeded to quote the language of the Virginia convention's formal instrument of ratification linking press and religion to states'
rights, and concluded that "liberty of conscience and freedom of the
press were equally and completely exempted from all authority
whatever of the United States."30 The pointed italics were
Madison's. Madison's words in 1800 mesh well with his earlier
27. 4 Elliot's Debates, supra note 5, at 540-41. Note how the Resolution's misquote, substituting "laws" for "law" in the First Amendment, renders that Amendment's language even closer to that of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
28. Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804) in 8 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, supra note 11, at 311.
29. 4 Elliot's Debates, supra note 5, at 571.
30. Id. at 576.
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words in the first Congress. In proposing an early version of the
Establishment Clause, Madison wondered aloud whether it was,
strictly speaking, "necessary"-because on Madison's view, Congress lacked enumerated power here-but noted that an amendment would resolve any possible ambiguity. 3 1 Note how he
explicitly linked the establishment issue to the Necessary and
Proper Clause:
[Slome of the State Conventions... seemed to entertain an
opinion that . . . the clause of the constitution, which gave
power to Congress to make all laws necessary and proper to
carry into execution the constitution, and the laws made
under it, enabled them to make laws of such a nature as
might infringe the rights of conscience, and establish a national religion; to prevent these effects he presumed the
amendment was intended .... 32
And in 1791 debates over the first bank, Madison yoked together
religion and press as examples of domains beyond Congress's Article I jurisdiction:
The defence against the charge founded on the want of a bill
of rights presupposed, he said, that the powers not given were
retained; and those not given were not to be extended by remote implications. On any other supposition, the power of
Congress to abridge the freedom of the press, or the rights of
33
conscience, &c., could not have been disproved.
Yet we must not let the similarities between the First Amendment's expressive rights and its Establishment Clause obscure a
difference that may well have profound implications for the relative ease with which they can be "incorporated" against states by
the Fourteenth Amendment. The expressive rights clausesSpeech, Press, Petitions, Assembly-sound in more than federalism, pure and simple. They explicitly speak of personal "freedoms"
(as does the "Free" Exercise Clause) and "right[s] of the people."
The Establishment Clause's bland language of laws "respecting...
establishment" does not. Put another way, even nationalists in the
31. 2 Schwartz, supra note 17, at 1088 (Madison's remarks of August 15,
1789).
32. Id. Madison's language here sharply contrasts with his discussion of our
Fourth Amendment, which Madison saw as cutting across, rather than marking
the boundary of, Article I enumerated power. See id. at 1030-31 (Madison's remarks of June 8, 1789).
33. 2 Annals of Cong. 1901 (1834) (Madison's remarks of February 2, 1791).
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1780s may have been willing to concede that Congress lacked
power to restrict speech and press, but none of them claimed that
Congress lacked power to protect a vigorous debate about national
issues against states that might seek to censor such speech. Nor is
there anything in the First Amendment that limits congressional
power to promote speech, press, petition, and assembly against
state repression.3 4 (And let us not forget that the Article IV republican government clause plausibly obliges Congress to protect political expression from state censorship.) 3 5 The First Amendment,
then, was not agnostic on whether speech, press, petition, assembly, and free exercise were liberties of citizens or good things. By
contrast, the Amendment was indeed agnostic on the issue of establishment. Congress had no more authority in the states to disestablish than to establish. Both actions were equally beyond
Congress's delegated powers; and the unfettered choice between
establishment and disestablishment was given to the states. As a
more pure federalism provision, then, the Establishment Clause
seems considerably more difficult to "incorporate" against states.
In the end, of course, the "incorporation" question will ultimately depend on a careful examination of the Fourteenth Amendment itself; regardless of its status in 1789, perhaps by 1866, the
Establishment Clause had come to be viewed as affirming an individual right against establishments rather than an agnostic federalism rule. For present purposes, it is enough to note that, given
its special logic and language, the Establishment Clause has less
in common with its fellow First Amendment clauses, and more
with the Tenth Amendment, than conventional wisdom admits. As
such, it raises distinctive "incorporation" problems, and will require scholars to examine with special care whether non-establishment-above and beyond other First Amendment provisions-was
widely understood during Reconstruction as a "privilege or immunity" of citizens rather than states.
It is apt that the incorporation of the Establishment Clause
first arose in a school case, Everson v. Board of Education,3 6 and
34. See Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers
of the People 19 (1965); 2 Crosskey, supra note 1, at 1057.
35. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) ("The very idea
of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to
meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a
redress of grievances.").
36. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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has had its most visible-if controversial-impact in public
schools. Consider, for example, the famous recent case from Rhode
Island, Lee v. Weisman, 37 in which the United States Supreme
Court invalidated a formal prayer at a public high school commencement ceremony. From one perspective, the twentieth-century state school is designed to serve a function very similar to that
of the eighteenth-century state church: imparting community values and promoting moral conduct among ordinary citizens, upon
whose virtue republican government ultimately rests. 38 For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 dealt with public
schools and religious organizations in back-to-back sections, and
treated "religious societies" as entities designed for the "encouragement of virtue" and "for the advancement of religion or learning."39
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 likewise spoke of "public
instructions" and "public teachers" in its provisions for establishing churches, and declared that "the happiness of a people, and the
40
good order" of society "depend upon piety, religion, and morality."
The language of Article III of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
adopted by the Confederation Congress during the very summer
that the Philadelphia Convention met, was to similar effect: "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government
and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education
shall forever be encouraged." 4 1 Consider also the Massachusetts
Constitution's language concerning Harvard College: "[Olur wise
and pious ancestors ... laid the foundation of Harvard College ....

[E]ncouragement of arts and sciences, and all good literature,
tends to the honor of God, the advantage of the Christian religion,
and the great benefit of this and the other United States of
-"42 Harvard, of course, was hardly unique; most of
America ...

37. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
38. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of The American Republic, 1776-1787,

427 (1969) ("Religion was the strongest promoter of virtue, the most important ally
of a well-constituted republic."). On the importance of virtue for self-governing
republics, see The Federalist No. 55 (James Madison).
39. Pa. Const. of 1776, §§ 44-45 (emphasis added).
40. Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. I, art. III.
41. Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, 1 Stat. 50, 52
n.(a) (1789), reprinted in 1 U.S.C. LI, LIII (1994).
42. Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. II, ch. V, art. I.
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the leading centers of learning in eighteenth-century America had
4s
religious roots.

But to see the analogy between today's public schools and yesterday's state churches is to see once again the federalism dimension of the original establishment clause. The possibility of
national control over a powerful intermediate association self-consciously trying to influence citizens' world views, shape their behavior, and cultivate their habits obviously struck fear in the
hearts of Anti-Federalists. Yet local control over such intermediate organizations seemed far less threatening, less distant, less
aristocratic, less monopolistic-just as local banks were far less
threatening than a national one, and local militias less dangerous
than a national standing army. Given the religious diversity of the
continent-with Congregationalists dominating New England, Anglicans down South, Quakers in Pennsylvania, Catholics huddling
together in Maryland, Baptists seeking refuge in Rhode Island,
and so on-a single national religious regime would have been horribly oppressive to many men and women of faith; local control, by
contrast, would allow dissenters in any place to vote with their feet
44
and find a community with the right religious tone.
This vision-of people voting with their feet to find or found
the kind of local religious community that was best for themwould probably sound odd to many Americans today, but it should
not surprise those of you familiar with the Founding of this state.
And so this vision-of freedom through federalism-may make
less sense for us today; but, I think, it would have made more sense
to Roger Williams himself.

43. The linkage between education and religion was so obvious that when
Madison proposed giving Congress explicit textual authority to establish a national university, he felt compelled to explicitly deny power to make that university sectarian. The proposal failed. 2 Farrand, supra note 16, at 616. See also 1
William Blackstone, Commentaries *97 (linking together the "establish[ment]" of
"the church of Scotland, and also the four universities of that kingdom").
44. See 3 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
§ 1873 (1833); Herbert J. Storing, What The Antifederalists Were For 22-23
(1981); Letters of Agrippa (XII), in 4 The Complete Anti-Federalist, supra note 17,
at 94.

